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Abstract
Employees of globalized Þrms face a riskier, but potentially more reward-
ing, menu of labor market outcomes. We document this neglected trade-oﬀ of
globalization for a sample of Indian manufacturing Þrms. On the one hand,
the employees of Þrms subject to foreign competition face a more uncertain
stream of earnings and riskier employment prospects. On the other, they en-
joy a more rapid career and/or have more opportunities to train and upgrade
their skills. The negative uncertainty costs and the positive incentive eﬀects
of globalization are thus twin to each other. Concentrating on just one side
of the coin gives a misleading picture of globalization.
JEL ClassiÞcation Numbers: F1, F16, J3, J31, O53
Keywords: Globalization; Uncertainty; Trade and Wages; Wages; Em-
ployment; India; Training, Promotions, Labor markets.
1 Introduction
Critics of globalization often argue that openness undermines labor market
institutions, raises job insecurity and the variability of earnings. When bar-
riers to good and factor mobility fall, Þrms can more easily substitute foreign
for domestic labor and consumers can more easily substitute foreign for do-
mestic goods. As a result, the Þrms demand for labor becomes more elastic,
and this causes higher uncertainty in earnings and employment. Hence, in a
world where risk-averse workers have only limited access to credit, they may
suﬀer from the breakdown of the implicit/explicit insurance scheme granted
by formal labor contracts.
This is only a partial rendition of the eﬀects of globalization on the la-
bor market. In this paper, we argue that employees of globalized Þrms
face a riskier but also more rewarding menu of labor market outcomes. We
document this trade-oﬀ for a sample of Indian manufacturing Þrms. We Þnd
that employees of Þrms subject to foreign competition indeed face more un-
certainty in their earning stream and employment prospects. However, their
career is also faster (they are more likely to be promoted) and/or their ability
to upgrade their skills is higher (they are more likely to be involved in train-
ing programs) than employees of Þrms shielded from foreign competition. In
other words, workers need not suﬀer passively from higher uncertainty: even
when they have limited access to the credit and insurance market, they can
(and do) self-insure by exerting more eﬀort and raise their expected income
stream. The negative uncertainty costs and the positive incentive eﬀects of
globalization are thus twin to each other. Isolating just one side of the coin
gives a misleading picture of globalization.
In developed economies, international economic integration has been blamed
for the rise of wage inequality and unemployment in the 1980s (e.g. see the
selective surveys of the main issues in Wood (1994, 1998)), although the
consensus is that only a fraction of the widening of skill premia may be rea-
sonably attributed to globalization. As to developing countries, the reasons
for concern about the eﬀects of globalization are even less apparent. The
Stolper-Samuelson theorem suggests that wage inequality should fall when
countries which are relatively abundant of unskilled labor open to trade.
Moreover, most models of imperfect competition suggest that, as market
size grows, workers should beneÞt from higher real wages and better em-
ployment opportunities.1 Supporting the presumption that trade integration
brings higher growth via technology transfers, knowledge spillovers and scale
1For an example of an imperfect competition model where trade integration raises wage
inequality see Manasse and Turrini (2002)
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economies, many studies have indeed found a signiÞcant empirical relation-
ship between exporting and productivity levels and growth rates. This is the
so called learning-by-exporting eﬀect, Þrst emphasized by Bernard and
Jensen (1997, 1999).2
The potential shortcomings of globalization in the Third World have been
most clearly and forcefully expressed in Rodrik (1997), among others. In ad-
dition to the costs of uncertainty, he argues that there may be a potential
trade-oﬀ between static and dynamic gains from trade: if specialization oc-
curs in traditional, less dynamic, sectors, growth may suﬀer in the long run.
Moreover, if the supply response of domestic exporters occurs with a lag,
while imports boom early on, the static gains from trade liberalization may
be smaller than expected and domestic production may face serious disrup-
tion. Altogether, this is supportive of the view that globalization brings
aggregate beneÞts while causing losers and winners within each country.
This paper presents new evidence on the labor market eﬀects of global-
ization, based on a newly assembled World Bank data set of Indian manufac-
turing Þrms for 1997-99. The paper presents two main substantive novelties
with respect to the literature,. First, rather than just focusing exclusively on
wages and employment data, we bring into the analysis non-wage beneÞts
such as promotions and training. We Þnd a systematic relation between such
labor market outcomes and the degree of Þrms exposure to foreign com-
petition. In particular, employees of exporting Þrms are exposed to higher
wage and employment variability, but also enjoy a higher probability of be-
ing promoted and trained than the employees of Þrms not subject to foreign
competition. The same applies, although to a lesser extent, to employees of
import-competing Þrms. Second, the robustness of our econometric results
is probed by applying standard econometric tools as well as less standard
non-parametric (matching) techniques. Our Þndings hold irrespective of the
estimation method.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a simple
model linking wage and employment uncertainty to skill-upgrading and ca-
reer. In this model, globalization is a mean-preserving increase in the vari-
ability of wages and productivity. Due to limited access to the insurance
market, risk-averse workers achieve self-insurance by exerting more eﬀort in
skill-upgrading activities (training). In equilibrium, more promotions and
training activities are thus expected in Þrms exposed to international com-
petition. Before moving to formally testing the implications of our model,
we discuss in Section 3 the reasons that make India in the late 1990s an ideal
2See also Epifani (2003) for a recent survey on these and other issues related to the
labor market eﬀects of trade liberalization in Developing Countries.
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case-study to learn about these issues. Following a long period of import-
substitution policies dating back to the 1950s, India undertook major steps
towards the reduction of barriers to trade in goods and capital between 1991
and 1997. Our 1997-99 data set of Indian manufacturing Þrms provides a
timely snapshot of opportunities and constraints brought about by trade re-
forms. The main features of our data set are presented in Section 4. Here we
compare the levels and variability of wages, employment, prices, sales, prof-
its, promotions and training for diﬀerent types of Þrms. These are classiÞed
as exposed to or protected from foreign competition according to their
characteristics in the product and capital market. In Section 5, we test the
models implications and the stylized facts presented in Section 4 by rigor-
ous econometric analysis. After decomposing the variability of labor market
outcomes into their cross-sectional (permanent) and time series (transitory)
components, such components are regressed on our measure of foreign expo-
sure, while controlling for sector, size and location characteristics. We then
estimate a probit model for the likelihood of promotions and training, with
productivity growth added to the same set of regressors as above. Finally,
we check that our results on the relation between foreign exposure and labor
market outcomes still hold when non-parametric (matching) techniques are
employed. Section 6 brießy summarizes and discusses the main conclusions.
2 A Simple Model of Uncertainty and the La-
bor Market
Here we develop a simple equilibrium model where the eﬀects of uncertainty
on workers and Þrms behavior are modelled. We can think of globalization
as adding to workers variability of real incomes and to Þrms variability
of proÞts. For example, terms of trade shocks will have a larger impact
on real wages, the higher the share of imported goods in the consumption
basket. Productivity shocks may also be related to international integration
in the goods market. We show that, if workers and Þrms have limited access
to the capital market, the former will exert more eﬀort and invest more
in skill upgrading (training) in order to protect themselves from real wage
uncertainty, and the latter will try to expand output in order to reduce the
costs of uncertainty on proÞts.
The economy is made of two sectors. A perfectly competitive (informal)
sector, say agriculture, employing only unskilled labor, and the manufactur-
ing sector, employing skilled and unskilled labor. The supply of unskilled
labor is perfectly elastic and there is perfect mobility across sectors, so that
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the real wage rate for unskilled labor is Þxed at w, the marginal value of
leisure time. Unlike workers employed in agriculture, a worker employed
in the manufacturing sector has the option to become skilled. This re-
quires training eﬀorts, and is associated with higher productivity. Given
the workers optimal supply of eﬀort, the Þrm chooses how many workers
to employ and the optimal incentive premium ∆. There are two sources of
uncertainty. The worker faces shocks to the purchasing power of his wage,
because of terms of trade shocks. The Þrm faces uncertainty in proÞts, due
to productivity shocks. The timing of events is the following. In stage one,
the Þrm chooses an incentive scheme ∆ and employment L, then a produc-
tivity shock ε ∼ (0, σ2ε) occurs. In stage two, the worker chooses eﬀort λ, and
Þnally a terms of trade shock occurs, v ∼ (0, σ2v). We start from this second
stage.
2.1 The Worker
The worker chooses the level of eﬀort in acquiring skills λ ∈ [0, 1], for given
wage rates. His eﬀort aﬀects the probability of a promotion, as well as his
productivity. If promoted, he earns w+∆+v, otherwise he earns w+v . For
simplicity, we assume that the probability of a promotion equals the eﬀort,
λ. Training eﬀort is costly, and brings disutility C(λ) = φ
2
λ2. The decision
to exert eﬀort is taken before the realization of the terms-of-trade shock. All
income is consumed. Therefore expected utility is
U = Ev [λu(w + v +∆) + (1− λ)u(w + v)]− φ
2
λ2 (1)
where u is a utility function, u0 > 0, u < 0. Taking a second-order Taylor
expansion around v = 0, U can be approximated with:
U ∼= λ
·
u(w +∆) +
σ2v
2
u00(w +∆)
¸
+ (1− λ)
·
u(w) +
σ2v
2
u00(w)
¸
− φ
2
λ2
Since the worker is risk-averse, u < 0,we see from the expression above that
uncertainty over the real wage reduces welfare. The Þrst order condition for
λ yields the optimal eﬀort level:
eλ = 1
φ
[u(w +∆)− u(w)] + σ
2
v
2
[u00(w +∆)− u00(w)] = Λ(∆;σ2v) (2)
The Þrst term in the last expression shows that the optimal level of train-
ing eﬀort is positively related to the utility gain from higher income, and
negatively related to the eﬀort cost, φ. The second term shows the eﬀect of
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wage uncertainty σ2v on eﬀort. The sign of this eﬀect depends on how the
attitude towards risk varies with income. If we make the reasonable (and
standard) assumption that the individual suﬀers less from uncertainty when
he becomes richer (i.e. we assume decreasing absolute risk-aversion, requir-
ing u000 > 0 3), then the term in the second square bracket is positive, and
wage uncertainty raises optimal training (and the probability of promotion).
The intuition is straightforward: faced with more uncertainty, the worker
self-insures against unwelcome income ßuctuations by raising his training
and productivity eﬀort. This raises is expected income stream, and makes
him less vulnerable to uncertainty.
2.2 The Firm
The Þrm chooses how many workers to employ and the optimal incentive
∆, taking workers behavior Λ(∆;σ2v) into account. The productivity of each
worker is stochastic and given by λ + ε. Letting L represent the number of
workers, employment in eﬃciency units is L(λ+ ε). Recalling that a fraction
λ of employees is paid w + ∆ and a fraction (1 − λ) is paid w, the Þrms
expected proÞts are
π = Eε {F (L(λ+ ε))− L[λ(w +∆) + (1− λ)w)]}
= Eε {F (L(λ+ ε))− L(w + λ∆)} (3)
where F denotes a standard production function, F 0 > 0, F 00 < 0.
Before the realization of the productivity shock, the Þrm chooses ∆ and
L in order to maximize expected proÞts. Proceeding as before, these can be
approximated by.
π ∼= F (λL)− [w + λ∆]L+ σ
2
ε
2
F 00(λL) =
= F (l)−
hw
λ
+∆
i
l +
σ2ε
2
F 00(l) (4)
where l = λL is labor in average eﬃciency units. The Þrm dislikes uncertainty
more, the more concave is the production function. The Þrst order condition
for l yields
F 0(l) +
σ2ε
2
F 000(l) =
w
λ
+∆ (5)
This expression equates the (risk corrected) marginal product of labor (in
average eﬃciency units) to the average wage (always expressed in eﬃciency
3Most types of commonly used utility function, including logaritmic, exponential,
Stone-Geary, show decreasing absolute risk aversion.
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units). From this expression one can derive a labor demand function:
el = l(w,∆;σ2ε) (6)
It is easy to show that productivity uncertainty σ2ε raises the demand for
labor if the curvature of the production function falls as l rises (F 000 > 0)
Intuitively, the Þrms cares less about uncertainty the higher its revenue,4 so
that it reacts to more uncertainty by expanding employment.
Finally, the Þrst order condition for the optimal incentive ∆ yields
η(e∆) = e∆ Λ(e∆;σ2v)
w
(7)
where η(∆) = ∆Λ0(.)/Λ is the elasticity of eﬀort with respect to the wage
premium. As in the standard eﬃciency wage model, the equality between
this elasticity and the wage premium completely determines ∆. Then, the
training supply schedule Λ(e∆;σ2v) (2) determines optimal training, while em-
ployment is determined by (6) through the identity eL = el/eλ.
Simple comparative statics show that:
1. A rise in wage uncertainty (σ2v) raises training eﬀort (λ) without aﬀecting
employment and the wage premium (if u000 > 0)
2. A rise in productivity uncertainty (σ2ε) raises employment without aﬀect-
ing training and the wage premium (if F 000 > 0)
2.3 Testable Implications
If uncertainty rises with the degree of exposure to international competition,
we expect to observe, ceteris paribus
1. more training, more promotions and higher productivity in Þrms that
compete internationally;
2. larger Þrms and larger shares of skilled workers in Þrms that compete
internationally;
3. similar wage premia across Þrms.
These implications - with the Þrst being our main focus here - are tested
against our data in the next sections.
3 Why India?
India in the late 1990s is an ideal laboratory to study the eﬀects of glob-
alization on Þrms behavior. The integration of Þrms in the world product
4A simple Cobb-Douglas function F (l) = la, a < 1 satisÞes this property.
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and capital markets confronts Þrms with new major possibilities and threats.
Given the size of Indias domestic market the potential disruption of domes-
tic producers is a crucial policy issue. This Section is a short recollection of
the evolution of Indias outward orientation policy.5
Since independence (1947), India has been characterized by active gov-
ernment intervention aimed at fostering domestic growth by import substi-
tution. Over the years, the economy became riddled with prohibitive tariﬀs
and import quotas. Industry-speciÞc licensing requirements were imposed on
investment projects beyond certain thresholds, and strategic sectors were
singled out and reserved for public enterprises. Restrictions were put in place
on FDI ßows, particularly those with little technological content. Production
and export subsidies were handed over to Þrms in order to encourage exports
beyond traditional labor intensive products.
In spite of much eﬀort, the results of public intervention were disappoint-
ing. At the end of the 1970s excess protection was Þnally recognized as the
main cause of technological backwardness, low product quality and variety,
and high costs, all of which made Indian goods non-competitive on the world
market. In the early 1980s, the Indian Government took the Þrst gradual
steps towards a partial trade and capital market liberalization. Tariﬀs and
import quotas were lifted on capital goods and technological imports. Tax
rates on proÞt expatriation and royalties were cut, and ceilings to foreign
shares in domestic companies raised in order to encourage FDIs and foreign
licensing collaborations.
While these limited reform attempts had some beneÞcial eﬀects, these fell
largely short of expectations, particularly when compared to similar reforms
in other Asian Newly Industrializing Countries. The balance of payments
crisis of 1990-91 gave the reform process a new impetus. In June 1991, a
newly elected Government initiated a major program of economic reform
and trade liberalization, supported by the IMF and the World Bank. The
New Industrial Policy (NIP) slashed average tariﬀs from 71 per cent in 1993
to 35 per cent in 1997, although tariﬀs remained high in several industries
(paper and paper products, wood, food, beverages and tobacco). Consider-
able steps towards a relaxing non-tariﬀ barriers were also taken. The number
of strategic sectors reserved to public enterprise was drastically reduced,
and the scope for application of the cumbersome licensing system severely
limited.
Under the NIP a new legislation was enacted allowing foreign majoritarian
participation in domestic shares, at least for high priority and export-
5This Section draws onWorld Bank (2000), International Monetary Fund (2001), World
Trade Organization (1998), Ministry of Finance of India (1999a,b).
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oriented industries. Technology transfer agreements were also no longer a
prerequisite for FDIs permissions.
The Þrst wave of reforms in the 1990s was a success. In 1992-1994, GDP
grew at 7% per year on average. Industrial production also grew at 7 percent
per year in 1992-1997, peaking to 12.8 per cent in 1995-96. Trade liberal-
ization provided impulse to exports and imports. Imports grew by 25% per
year in 1993-96, a big jump from the 15% rate of the previous Þve years,
while exports grew in line with the previous period (also at a yearly rate of
25%). Finally, private sector investment rose at an annual rate of 16.5% in
1993-96, up by about two percentage point per year from the previous Þve
years.
The beneÞts didnt last long, however. After the growth peak in 1995-
1996, industrial production, exports and imports decelerated (respectively
to 5.6, 6.5 and 6.7%) in the two subsequent years. The South-East Asian
crisis in 1997-98 and the subsequent deceleration in the growth of world trade
brought the growth of the Indian economy to a grind.
The slowdown in Indian industrial growth was probably aggravated by the
reversal of the economic reform process (see World Bank (2000)). Between
1997 and 1999 new trade restrictions were put in place. Non-tariﬀ barriers
and anti-dumping measures took on an increasingly crucial role.6
Our data set, whose main features are described in Section 4, provides
a Þrm-level snapshot of the critical years, 1997-99, of Indias process of eco-
nomic reform.
4 The Data Set
Next we present the main features of the data set. We highlight the most
important diﬀerences between Þrms that are subject to international com-
petition and those who are not. The data set is the result of a survey of
895 Indian Þrms recently conducted by the World Bank. It contains infor-
mation on ownership structure, investment and technology, relations with
suppliers and government, location, trade, products and inputs, labor and
human resources, assets and liabilities, for the period 1997-1999. The Þrms
covered by the survey belong to Þve manufacturing sectors: Garments, Tex-
tiles, Drugs and Pharmaceuticals (a branch of Chemicals), Electronic Con-
sumer Goods, and Electrical White Goods (a branch of electrical machinery).
6As an example, one might mention that 103 antidumping measures were still active
in 2000, compared to 64 in 1999 and 49 in 1998. IMF (2001) reports that, in 1997-2000,
there was nearly no change in the average tariﬀs rates, although the maximum rate bound
was reduced from 45 to 35 per cent.
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They are located in the cities of Ahmedabad (State of Gujarat), Bangalore
(Karnataka), Calcutta (West Bengal), Chandigarh (Punjab), Chennai (Tamil
Nadu), Cochin (Kerala), Delhi (Haryana), Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh),
Kanpur (Uttar Pradesh), Mumbai and Pune (Maharashtra). The poor cen-
tral states of Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, and Bihar, as well as Rajasthan and
other smaller States, are not represented in the sample.
4.1 Defining ”globalization”
The Þrst step for assessing the labor market implications of globalization is
to deÞne what we mean and how we measure globalization for an individual
Þrm. Globalization exposes Þrms to foreign competition in the product and
capital market. Therefore we use the following two criteria.
As far as the product market is concerned, one would ideally estimate the
elasticity of substitution between the Þrms product and that of domestic
and foreign competitors. In the absence of detailed information on domestic
and foreign prices and quantities, however, we proceed as follows. A Þrm
may face foreign competition either on the domestic (if import-competing)
or on foreign (if exporting) markets, or both. As to the former, we deÞne
as Exporters (E) all the Þrms whose revenue share from exports is greater
or equal than 30% (and non-exporters the remaining ones). Exporters make
up 36.7% of the Þrms in the sample. As to the latter, we classify as Import
Competitors, IC, those Þrms which jointly satisfy two criteria: they declare
to face foreign competition in the domestic market (they answer yes to the
question: Are any of the competitors in the domestic market foreign Þrms
?), and they are not classiÞed as exporters. This deÞnition picks 28% of the
Þrms. Our control group is made of the remaining Þrms (which are neither
E or IC). This group is labelled P as protected from foreign competition
in the goods market, whereas lack of foreign competition may be the result
of either political (e.g. tariﬀs) or natural (e.g. transport costs) barriers to
trade. These Þrms altogether represent about 35.3% of the sample. Each
Þrm belongs to one of the three mutually exclusive categories: E, IC, P.7
In order to capture a Þrms integration in the international capital mar-
kets, we exploit the information concerning the Þrms capital ownership. We
label as Foreign Owned(FO) any Þrm with a strictly positive share of for-
eign participation in its capital. Such extensive deÞnition is warranted by
the fact that only a small minority of Þrms in the sample (4%) declare a
foreign participation in its capital. The drawback of this deÞnition is that it
7Firms in group E may or may not sell a part of their product in the domestic market
and, in case they do, may or may not face foreign competition also in the domestic market.
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cannot discriminate between multinational corporations and joint ventures.
The activity of the former is often still subject to strict Government regu-
lation. Joint ventures, in contrast, are often crucial vehicles of globalization
as well as new modes of production and organization, despite the fact that
they typically do not involve massive injection of foreign capital.
A note of caution is in order here. Some of our variables of interest,
namely training and promotions, are only available for a subset of Þrms (62%
of the total) and for 1999. The smaller sample - on which we concentrate
our attention - may in principle suﬀer from a selection bias and present a
distorted picture of the complete sample. We checked that this is not the
case by comparing the summary statistics for a number of variables for which
data are available for the entire sample (and its subset). These statistics turn
out to be virtually identical.
4.2 Sectors and Locations
Table 1 and 2 present a summary of the distribution of the (smaller sample
of) 555 Þrms according to our classiÞcation, and separately reporting the
sector (table 1) and location (table 2) by column.
Table 1 shows that, according to our deÞnitions of foreign competition,
Þrms are much more integrated in the product than in the capital market.
Almost two thirds of Þrms in the sample are exposed to product market
competition (37% are exporters and 27% are import competitors). Foreign
capital, by contrast, plays a minor role in the ownership structure of Þrms:
only 4% of Þrms have foreign participation in their capital. The distribution
of Þrms across the E, IC, P categories varies greatly across sectors, revealing
an interesting pattern of comparative advantage. Textiles is the only sec-
tor with shares of E, IC, P very close to the sample average. In contrast,
garments and electrical machinery represent polar cases. About 60% of the
Þrms operating in the former sector are exporters, while most Þrms in the
latter are either protected or import-competitors. Similarly, a majority of
Þrms declares to be exposed to foreign competition in Drugs & Pharmaceu-
ticals. Foreign-owned Þrms (FO) mostly concentrate in Textiles and Drugs
& Pharmaceuticals, where they represent respectively 5% and 7.5% of the
total number of Þrms in each sector.
Table 2 cross-tabulates our classiÞcation of exposure to foreign compe-
tition against the location dimension. Two thirds of Þrms agglomerate in
larger cities (Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai). Each urban area presents a rela-
tively specialized structure of production. Most Þrms in Delhi are in P, the
protected manufacturing sector. Those in Mumbai are prevalently IC, i.e.
import-competing Þrms. Roughly two thirds of the Þrms located in Chennai,
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as well as in Hyderabad and Cochin, belong to the E class. Bangalore, the
preferred location for software industry, is also a highly globalized city, with
more than 85% of Þrms either in the E or the IC groups. Kanpur and Pune
are home to mainly protected Þrms. Finally, most FO Þrms are located in
Delhi (7% of total Þrms), but it is in Bangalore, Cochin and Chandigarh
where they represent the biggest shares of total Þrms (respectively 8%, 18%
and 18% of the total number of Þrms). No foreign owned Þrms are sampled
in Ahmedabad and Kanpur.
Notably, the pattern of association between foreign exposure and Þrms
localization is fully consistent with the Þndings in Sachs, Bajpai and Ramiah
(2002) and Bajpai (2002), where access to the sea is found to be an important
determinant of the export status of an Indian Þrm.8
4.3 Wages and Employment
Next we compare several labor market features across the various groups
of Þrms. The questionnaire provides information concerning employment,
hours worked and wages for Þve categories of workers (non-production work-
ers, unskilled production workers, skilled production workers, professionals
and managers). We aggregate the Þrst three groups into Blue collars, and
the last two into White collars. Table 3 shows the Þgures for absolute
and relative wages and employment. Wages are calculated as hourly nom-
inal earnings in thousands of current rupees. These are computed, for blue
and white collars separately, as the ratios between the corresponding yearly
wage rate and the total amount of hours worked (the product of the average
number of hours times number of employees). The average number of hours
worked is inferred from information about work shifts, the average hours
worked per day and the number of days of work in a year. On average, the
hourly wage of white collars is 7.7 times as large as that of blue collars.
The average wage diﬀerential is larger in exporting Þrms (8.4 times) than
elsewhere (7.1 times, both in IC and P Þrms). Yet Table 3 clearly shows that
wages and employment levels do not signiÞcantly diﬀer between the E, IC
and P Þrms: the test for equality of group means, at the bottom of the table,
is never rejected at the 5% conÞdence level. In other words, exporting or
import-competing Þrms neither pay below or above average wages to either
8The cities of Chennai, Hyderabad, Cochin, Bangalore - all located in Southern states
- are close to the sea shores or with easy access to the sea. Delhi and Kanpur are instead
in landlocked states. Pune is in a region of Majarashstra rather far from the Ocean.
Accordingly, exporting Þrms are less present in these localities. Calcutta and Mumbai are
on the Ocean, but are also huge metropolitan areas, which may explain the large shares
enjoyed by protected Þrms in these cities.
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blue or white collars. On the contrary, there is some evidence that foreign-
owned Þrms pay white collars somewhat less - in absolute and relative terms
- than domestically owned Þrms.
The average Þrm size, measured by employment, is relatively large in our
sample, 220 workers, see the last column in table 3. Thus small and medium-
sized enterprises are presumably under-represented in the sample. Firms do
not appear to diﬀer signiÞcantly in size between exposed and non-exposed
Þrms, but foreign owned Þrms appear signiÞcantly larger than domestically
owned ones.9
We conclude that, at least in our sample, globalization is not associated
to signiÞcant diﬀerences in absolute or relative wages and Þrm size, with the
notable exception of foreign owned Þrms.
4.4 Variability
While wage and employment levels tend to be similar across groups, Þrms
with greater foreign exposure face much more uncertainty in labor and
product market outcomes, both in terms of dispersion across Þrms and in
terms of variability in time. Next we look at the dispersion of wages and
employment, as well as of prices, proÞts and sales. We construct the Þrms
output price variable as an index obtained from the prices of the three main
products sold by each Þrm in each year. Such product prices are geometri-
cally aggregated, using each products share in sales as a weight. Net proÞts
are deÞned as the before-tax operating surpluses net of interest charges, de-
preciation and other overhead expenses.
In order to isolate the concept of variability which is more likely aﬀected
by globalization, we apply the method suggested by Gottschak and Mof-
Þtt (1994). The variance of a variable, say the wage rate, observed over time
and for diﬀerent Þrms, can be decomposed into two separate elements: the
Þrst represents the cross-sectional dispersion at a point in time; the second
is the (squared) deviation of the individual variable from its own time av-
erage.10 The former presumably reßects long-run phenomena, resulting, in
the example, in wage dispersion across Þrms. This component is usually
termed permanent volatility, σ2µ. The latter presumably reßects short-run
shocks that raise the variability over time of, say, the wage rate in individual
Þrms. This component is termed transitory volatility, σ2v.Since our aim here
9Small protected Þrms also tend to be less capital intensive and less unionized than
those exposed foreign competition (the data are not reported here)
10Formally, let wit, represent Þrm i
0s wage rate at time t, µi the permanent (time
invariant) and vit the transitory components, with wit = µi+vit . The variance of wit can
be written as the sum of the two variances σ2µ + σ
2
v.(see Gottschak and Moﬃtt (1994))
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is to test whether international integration makes life more uncertain for
workers and Þrms, we focus on the short-run component.
Table 4 summarizes the results of such a decomposition. Each cell shows
the transitory variance as a ratio of total variance, σ2v/σ
2. Compared to
protected (P) Þrms, Exporters present systematically higher transitory vari-
ance ratios. This is clearly the case for wages, employment, prices and sales,
while the diﬀerence is less marked for net proÞts. Import competitors present
higher transitory variance for employment, prices and sales, but stable wages
and proÞts.11
Altogether, Table 4 provides evidence that globalization is often asso-
ciated with uncertainty in labor and product market outcomes, particularly
so for exporters.
4.5 Training and Promotions
So far, we found that while globalization is not signiÞcantly related to
Þrms absolute and relative wages and employment, it is closely associated
to more volatile labor and product market outcomes. So much for the bad
news for risk-averse workers and Þrms. The question here is whether glob-
alization also brings good news. Next we show that the good news is more
rapid careers (promotions) and more skill-upgrading (training). Promotions
and training are crucial elements for comparing workers lifetime earnings in
diﬀerent Þrms. Despite the fact that wages tend to be equalized across Þrms,
possibly as a result of labor mobility, the present value of a workers expected
income stream may diﬀer dramatically depending on how eﬀectively he can
accumulate human capital (training), and, possibly as a result, how fast he
moves up the hierarchy ladder (promotions). Our next results are consistent
with implication 1 and 3 of our stylized model: globalization brings more
uncertainty, but, by doing so, it provides the incentive for higher eﬀort in
acquiring skills and therefore brings more promotions.
We start from promotions. The last column in Table 5 shows the per-
centage of a Þrms employees promoted in 1999 (the frequency of promotion)
for Þrms belonging to the diﬀerent categories. The striking feature is that
an employee of an Exporting Þrm is twice as likely to be promoted in the
current year as the average worker (4% and 2%, respectively), and no less
than three times as likely as the employee of a protected Þrm.12 Given the
size of the wage diﬀerentials documented earlier, this Þnding implies that
11Lack of data prevents the same calculation for FO and DO Þrms.
12In contrast, the probabilities of promotion in IC and P Þrms are not signiÞcantly
diﬀerent from each other.
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an E-Þrm employee, despite currently earning roughly as much as a P-Þrm
employee, enjoys in expected terms a considerably larger income stream.
The beneÞts of globalization, however, do not stop here. In the question-
naire, Þrms are asked to report whether their workers are engaged in formal
training schemes (either in-house or external to the Þrm). To this question
549 Þrms answer yes and 532 no. Table 5, third column, shows the
percentage of Þrms declaring to have trained their workers in 1999, for the
diﬀerent groups of Þrms. About 28% of the Þrms in the sample have part of
their work force engaged in training programs. Interestingly, the Þgure rises
considerably among the exporters, 31%, and even more among the import
competitors, 36%, while it falls to only 19% for the group of protected Þrms.
Even more strikingly, 77% of foreign owned Þrms engage in training activi-
ties, as opposed to only 19% of domestically owned. The mean equality tests
conÞrm this evidence: the means of the E and IC are statistically diﬀerent
form the mean of P Þrms, and the same holds for foreign and domestically
owned.
A similar picture appears by looking at the shares of Þrms employees
involved in training programs (second column in Table 5). IC Þrms are by
far the most heavily involved in training. The equality of means test conÞrms
again this result, although the diﬀerence is signiÞcant only at the 7% level
of conÞdence.
In summary, globalization makes life riskier for Indian workers and
Þrms, but at the same time it provides them with the incentives (and the
opportunities) to face the new challenges: higher investment in training and,
possibly as a result, higher probability of promotions (for exporters).
5 Econometric Analysis
Our aim here is to move beyond the descriptive statistics and unconditional
mean tests presented in Section 4, and to submit our preliminary Þndings
to rigorous multivariate econometric analysis. For that purpose we employ
a variety of parametric and non-parametric techniques. We start from stan-
dard (parametric) econometric analysis. First we estimate a model for the
transitory variance of labor and product market outcomes, in order to as-
sess the role of international competition. Second, we use probit analysis to
model the probability of promotion and the likelihood of training programs.
Finally, we employ non-parametric techniques (matching estimates) to check
whether the statistical relationship between international exposure and labor
market outcomes survives, once many of the assumptions underlying para-
metric analysis are relaxed. Overall, our previous Þndings withstand these
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checks.
5.1 Parametric Estimates
5.1.1 Variability
Is globalization associated to higher variability of labor and product market
outcomes? Our Þrst set of OLS regressions, described in Table 6, tackles this
question. Here the logarithm of the Þrms transitory variances is regressed
on two sets of dummy variables: one for foreign exposure in the product
market (E, IC, P), and in the capital market (FO vs. DO). In order to con-
trol for Þrms sector, size and location,13 we also introduce the corresponding
dummies in diﬀerent speciÞcations. For the variables referring to foreign ex-
posure, we choose to omit the dummies for protected and domestically owned
Þrms. For the sector and size controls, we employ the normalization proposed
by Suits (1984). This enables us to interpret the regression coeﬃcients as the
diﬀerential eﬀect of a change in a given explanatory variable with respect to
a domestically owned, protected Þrm of average size and sector.
Table 6 shows the outcome of such regressions for diﬀerent speciÞcations
each adding in turn size, sector and location controls. A few interesting
results are worth noticing. First, the Exporter dummy is always signiÞ-
cant and positive for the transitory variances of prices, sales, employment
and proÞts. It is also positive but not always signiÞcant for wages. At a
conÞdence interval of 10 or 5 percent, its coeﬃcient never falls below 1.5 in
every equation. Thus exporters experience a transitory variance of product
and labor market outcomes that is at least 3.5% above that of a protected
domestically-owned average Þrm.14 This coeﬃcient is the lowest bound of
the reported coeﬃcients, but also the most reliable one, since the appended
controls are all statistically signiÞcant according to the standard F-tests of
joint signiÞcance. Hence, the larger estimates obtained in more parsimonious
regressions are biased.
Second, the regressions yield less clear-cut results for both IC and FO
dummies. In the basic speciÞcation, that does not include additional controls,
the coeﬃcient of IC is positive and statistically signiÞcant, implying that
foreign competition on the domestic markets raises the transitory variability
of product and labor market variables. The positive eﬀect, however, often
disappears, once additional controls are included in the equations (and found
13A Þrm is deÞned small if employment is less than 50, medium between 50 and 200
units, and large when employment is more than 200 units.
14In our semi-logarithmic equations, the eﬀect of a dummy variable on the dependent
variable is given by eβ-1, so that in the example 3.5=exp(1.5)-1.
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jointly signiÞcant by the F test). When the coeﬃcient of IC survives, as is
the case in the sales and wage equations, the inclusion of the second set of
controls sharply reduces the size of the pointwise estimates (see for example
the equation for σv,Sales). The dummy for foreign ownership, FO, although
positive and signiÞcant in the basic speciÞcations, never survives the inclusion
of size, sector and location dummies.
We interpret this evidence as showing that globalization raises product
and labor market uncertainty for Þrms and workers, albeit not equally for
all categories of Þrms. The eﬀect is stronger for exporting Þrms, and weaker
for those which declare to face foreign competitors in the domestic market.
Foreign ownership, in contrast, is not signiÞcantly associated to transitory
shocks: the inclusion of other potential determinants of variability eliminate
the statistical signiÞcance of this characteristic. While this result may have
to do with the limited number of foreign-owned Þrms in our sample, this
conclusion is not implausible if one considers that multinationals and joint
ventures may often diversify away the consequences of the transitory shocks
through transfer pricing and other Þnancial policies more easily than domes-
tically owned Þrms.
5.1.2 Training
Does exposure to international competition raise the incentive for Þrms and
workers to engage in training? We model the presence/absence of training
as a discrete limited dependent variable, which is assumed to be distributed
as a standard normal. In the probit analysis, the unobservable indicator is
modeled as a function of foreign exposure, size, sector, and location dum-
mies, as well as a function of a continuous variable, the Þrms productivity
growth. This variable captures the possibility that fast growing Þrms may
be more inclined to pay for their employees training. Productivity growth is
proxied by the growth rate of sales (at constant 1998 prices) per employee.
Table 7 reports the estimates (the marginal eﬀects)15 of the probit analysis,
conducted as usual over a sample trimmed of the 2% largest and smallest
observations, so as to reduce the chance of incurring in outliers.
The Þrst speciÞcation only includes our foreign exposure dummies for
exporting, import-competing and foreign owned Þrms. The estimated coef-
Þcients for exporting Þrms are always positive and statistically signiÞcant.
This means that the employees of exporting Þrms face a 12% higher probabil-
15The marginal eﬀects describe the probability change originated by an inÞnitesimal
change in each independent continuous variable (calculated at the mean level of the inde-
pendent variable) or, for dummy variables, the discrete probability change associated to
the 0-1 shift. These coeﬃcients are calculated by means of the STATA dprobit procedure.
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ity of being involved in training programs than the employees of an average
protected and domestically owned Þrm. This probability rises to more than
50% for the employees of foreign owned Þrms. These results are robust to the
inclusion of size, sector and location dummies. As shown in the third row of
Table 7, the best Þtting equation, in terms of pseudo R-squared, is obtained
including all controls, except for productivity growth (whose inclusion is ab-
solutely immaterial in all cases). Here the coeﬃcients for E stay unchanged
both in signiÞcance and size, and the coeﬃcient for FO, albeit smaller, re-
mains statistically diﬀerent from zero. The coeﬃcient of the IC dummy is
instead no longer signiÞcant after conditioning on the other dummies.
We interpret these results as evidence that, possibly as the result of the
larger uncertainty associated to international competition, employees of ex-
porting and foreign owned Þrms are more likely to be engaged in training and
skill upgrading programs. This result, however, does not extend to domestic
import competitors, which presumably cannot aﬀord such programs.
5.1.3 Promotions
Do employees of globalized Þrms enjoy more rapid careers? To answer this
question, we look at promotion rates. We model the occurrence of a promo-
tion as discrete limited dependent variable whose probability distribution is
assumed to be a standard normal (i.e. a probit). The binary indicator is
again modeled as a function on foreign exposure, size, sector, and location
dummies. The results are shown in Table 8. The probability of a promo-
tion within a year is 2.7% higher for E-Þrms employees than for the other
workers.16 This Þnding survives the inclusion of a control for productivity
growth (see row 2), which is statistically signiÞcant with a coeﬃcient of about
0.02, as well as the inclusion of the location dummies, the only statistically
signiÞcant dummies (see row 3). While the E coeﬃcient slightly falls in mag-
nitude (from .027 to .022) with the inclusion of the location dummies, it is
still precisely estimated at conventional conÞdence levels. In contrast, the
coeﬃcients of import competing and foreign owned Þrms are not statistically
signiÞcant, with or without additional controls.
5.2 Non-parametric Estimates
The fact that some of our proxies for exposure to international competition
in the product and capital market occasionally become insigniÞcant when
16Note that, in all regressions, promotions are not measured in percentage points, while
the summary statistics on promotions presented in Table 5 (column 3) are in percentage
points.
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dummies for sector and location are included, suggests the possibility of an
endogeneity bias. A particular location/sector may be associated with lower
transport cost or higher export subsidy, thus making exports more proÞtable.
In order for the OLS and probit estimates to be unbiased two conditions
must be satisÞed: recursivity and linearity in coeﬃcients. Recursivity re-
quires the residuals in the foreign exposure equation be uncorrelated with
those of the training and promotion equations. The remedy is instrumental
variable, but our data set, with its limited time dimension, does not contain
reliable instruments. Linearity is also a potentially restrictive assumption.
Suppose for example that exporting Þrms are systematically located in some
sectors (e.g. textiles) and localities (e.g. Chennai). This introduces a non-
linearity, which, if important, would make OLS estimates severely biased. A
possible remedy to both problems is to resort to non-parametric techniques,
which do not make speciÞc assumptions about functional form, and also ad-
dress the problem of simultaneity. Non-parametric methods have been used
in the medical sciences at least since the 1970s. Labor economists (see e.g.
Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997)) have used such tools to evaluate la-
bor market and educational programs. More recently, Persson, Tabellini and
Trebbi (2000) and Persson and Tabellini (2002, ch.5) have applied them to
political economics issues (we refer to their papers for a practical discussion
of such techniques).
5.2.1 Methodology
We implement matching methods in our framework using the procedure de-
veloped by Becker and Ichino (2002, freely downloadable at their home pages)
as follows. First, we estimate each Þrms probability of being an exporter
rather than a protected Þrm (the so called propensity score). This is done
running a probit model on our set of explanatory variables X that includes
sector and location dummies. This stage allows us to reduce the initial multi-
dimensional diﬀerences between Þrms to a single number, say the probability
of being an exporter. Based on the calculated propensity scores, we split
the sample into Þve groups (or strata). Within each group, we match
the closest twins, i.e. the exporting Þrms with the most similar propen-
sity scores, and calculate the diﬀerences between the respective variable of
interest (variability, training, promotion). We repeat this procedure for all
the twins in each group (with the non-closest twins excluded from the anal-
ysis). Finally, we calculate the average diﬀerence within each group, as well
as a group-weighted sample-wide average diﬀerence between exporters and
protected Þrms. This gives an estimate of the diﬀerential eﬀect of export
activity with respect to protection on, say, the probability of training. By
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selecting the most similar pairs, this technique (called neighbor matching
method) attempts at isolating the average eﬀect of the variable of interest
(the treatment, in the medical jargon, here the measures of foreign expo-
sure) on the endogenous variable (the treated, here respectively variability,
training and promotions).
A balancing test checks that the propensity scores are correctly iden-
tiÞed, namely that the means of the explanatory variables (sector, locality)
of the exporting and protected Þrms belonging to each group do not diﬀer
signiÞcantly. If the test is rejected, then Þrm pairs diﬀer signiÞcantly even
within groups, suggesting that partition is probably too coarse and needs to
be reÞned. Finally, note that the explanatory variables should not explain
the exporter/protected status too well. If they do, this may be due to the
fact that some groups only contain one category, say exporters, which would
make matching unfeasible. In contrast, the omission of potentially relevant
explanatory variable does not invalidate our results, as long as the omitted
variables aﬀect the two categories of Þrms equally. For these reasons we opt
for a slightly parsimonious speciÞcation that only include sector and location
dummies. The same procedure is applied for comparing import-competing
to protected Þrms.
5.2.2 Results for Variability, Training and Promotions
We calculate propensity scores for exporting versus protected Þrms, and for
import-competing versus protected Þrms. The same exercise could not be run
for foreign and domestically owned Þrms, due to limited number of foreign
owned Þrms present in our sample.
The conventional t-statistics for the equality of the propensity scores of ex-
porters and protected Þrms (respectively, import-competitors and protected)
indicate that the balancing property is satisÞed in each group. As brießy dis-
cussed previously, this means that sector and location dummies do a good job
in selecting pairs of Þrms that can be potentially matched. This enables us
to move to the second step and proceed with the neighbor matching method.
Table 9, Þrst column, shows the average eﬀects of the diﬀerent treatments
(E , IC) on goods and labor market outcomes. Looking at the variability
results Þrst, the exporter status signiÞcantly raises the transitory variability
of wages, employment, sales and proÞts. The import competitor status is
associated to larger transitory variability of wages, sales, proÞts. Compared
to parametric estimates, the newly estimated coeﬃcients show the same sign
and, when signiÞcantly diﬀerent from zero, similar orders of magnitude.
The average eﬀects of our treatments on training and promotions are
reported in the bottom part of Table 9. The E status signiÞcantly raises the
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probability of promotions (by 2.5%), but not that of training. The former
result is quite consistent as to size and signiÞcance with the result found us-
ing parametric estimates, while the latter result is at variance with it. This
may have to do with the changing sample size, which shrinks by about one
hundred observations in the non-parametric case compared to the parametric
case (falling from 402 to 306). The non-parametric estimates also show that
the IC status is associated to a positive eﬀect (+12%) on the probability for a
Þrm to engage in a training program. As reported in Table 9, this eﬀect was
not precisely estimated in the correspondent parametric case. The matching
estimated coeﬃcient of IC in promotions is not statistically diﬀerent from
zero, similarly to the parametric case.
We conclude that matching estimators are quite successful in capturing the
eﬀects of foreign exposure on training and promotions. The promotions re-
sults are virtually identical to those of the parametric estimation methods.
The training results assign either to IC (non-parametric) or E (parametric)
the most signiÞcant eﬀects.
5.2.3 Brief Summary of the Econometric Results
In summary, our econometric results show that globalization is signiÞcantly
associated to higher variability of product and labor market outcomes, with
exporters suﬀering from uncertainty more than import competitors (the bad
side of international integration). In addition, workers in foreign-owned,
import-competing and exporting Þrms are found to be more likely to be in-
volved in training programs, with employees of exporting Þrms also enjoying
more rapid careers (the good side of globalization).
Altogether, parametric and non-parametric estimation methods tend to pro-
duce remarkably consistent results. Hence, our Þndings do not suﬀer from
the endogeneity bias nor they are particularly sensitive to the assumptions
of functional forms, although those for import competitors seem slightly less
robust to changes of speciÞcations.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have reached three main conclusions. First, we Þnd no evi-
dence that the absolute and relative wages diﬀer signiÞcantly between glob-
alized and non-globalized Þrms. However, we Þnd that globalized Þrms are
systematically exposed to higher uncertainty, over employment, sales, proÞts
and prices. Finally, we Þnd that globalization brings beneÞts in addition to
costs. Employees of import-competing, exporting and foreign-owned Þrms
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beneÞt from more involvement in training programs; employees of exporting
Þrms also beneÞt from more rapid careers. This evidence survives inclusion
of diﬀerent control variables, as well as diﬀerent estimation techniques.
These results are consistent with the simple model sketched in Section 2.
If workers have limited access to credit markets, when facing higher real in-
come uncertainty they will invest in training, eﬀort and productivity in order
self insure and raise the probability of a promotion. Clearly, other plausible
explanations may be possible. Firms, facing more competition from abroad,
may wish to invest more in training and human capital, in order to innovate
and diﬀerentiate their products, and save proÞt margins /market shares. Yet
this alternative explanation does not explain why globalization does not have
an eﬀect on the skill premium, something successfully confronted with by our
eﬃciency-wage model.
Clearly, our conclusions apply to a limited sample of Indian Þrms. Do
they extend to other countries? We do not know yet. If they do, however, a
tentative policy implication might follow. Our results can be interpreted as
saying that domestic workers and Þrms, when confronted with globalization,
are not necessarily powerless, even when their access to the capital market
is limited. Globalization raises insecurity, but also seems to provide workers
and Þrms with better incentives and more opportunities. This suggests that
Government-funded safety nets programs, often run in parallel to trade liber-
alization policies (see Rodrik (1998)), should complement, and not substitute
private sector response. This may occur, for example, by making income sup-
port schemes conditional on Þrms and workers revealed willingness to train
and adapt themselves to the changing external environment. Future work
will shed light on these policy-oriented issues.
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Table 1. Firm breakdown by foreign exposure and sector 
Number of  Firms Operating in Each Sector 
 
  Garments Textiles Drugs & Pharmaceutic.
Electronic 
Consumer 
Goods 
Electrical 
White Goods
 
All categories   
(555) 
 
 
178 
 
179 
 
142 
 
44 
 
32 
 
E (Exporters) 
(209) 
 
102 63 36 2 6 
 
IC (Import-competitors) 
(150) 
 
 
28 
 
36 49 20 17 
 
P (Protected)                  
(196) 
 
48 60 57 22 9 
 
FO (Foreign Owned)              
(22) 
 
3 13 18 2 2 
DO (Domestically Owned)    
 (511) 
 
240 232 220 62 71 
 
Notes: Exporters (E) refer to firms whose (total exports) / (total sales) > 30%. Import  Competiors indicates  firms 
declaring to have foreign competitors in the domestic market. Protected refers to firms which are neither E nor IC. 
Foreign Owned (FO) refers to firms with at least 4% of foreign capital. Domestic Owned refers to firms which are 
not FO 
 
 II
Table 2. Firm breakdown by foreign exposure and location 
# Firms Operating in Each Locality (States in  parentheses) 
 
Location  
3 
Categories 
E IC P 
Mumbai (Maharashrtra)       127 32 60 35 
Delhi (Haryana)       141 42 36 63 
Chennai  (Tamil Nadu) 109 71 11 27 
Ahmedabad (Gujarat) 22 7 5 10 
Calcutta (West Bengal) 29 5 8 16 
Bangalore (Karnataka)  34 13 15 6 
Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh) 36 21 6 9 
Kanpur  (Uttar Pradesh)           26 4 2 20 
Chandigarh (Punjab) 13 6 4 3 
Pune (Maharashtra) 8 1 2 5 
Cochin (Kerala) 10 7 1 2 
All localities 555 209 150 196 
 
 III
Table 3. Employment and wages 
Means for Selected Variables 
 
Sample  
W B  
 
W W  
 
W W / W B   
 
L W / L B
 
L TOT  
 
3 Categories (555) 
                               
 
.038 
(239) 
 
.18 
(239) 
 
7.7 
(239) 
 
.33 
(239) 
 
220 
(216) 
  
E  (209) 
                            
 
.035 
(115) 
 
.19 
(115) 
 
8.4 
(115) 
 
.34 
(115) 
 
293 
(103) 
 
IC (150) 
 
 
.041 
(50) 
 
.15 
(50) 
 
7.17 
(50) 
 
.35 
(50) 
 
276 
(43) 
 
P  (196) 
 
.046 
(74) 
 
.18 
(74) 
 
7.09 
(74) 
 
.30 
(74) 
 
166 
(71) 
FO (22) 
 
.03 
(11) 
 
.07 
(11) 
 
4.09 
(11) 
 
.35 
(21) 
 
553 
(34) 
DO (533) .04 (218) 
 
.19 
(218) 
 
8.30 
(224) 
 
 
.32 
(455) 
165 
(466) 
P-values for  Mean Equality 
Test: 
P vs. E 
 
 
.73 
 
.96 
 
.62 
 
.44 
 
.30 
P-values for Mean Equality 
Test: 
P vs. IC 
 
 
.88 
 
.71 
 
.96 
 
.49 
 
.22 
P-values for Mean Equality 
Test: 
FO vs. DO  
 
 
.44 
 
.01∗ 
 
.02∗ 
 
.45 
 
.03∗ 
 
Notes 
The asterisk (*) indicates that the means calculated for the two groups of firms are significantly different, at a 5% 
confidence level. 
WW = average hourly wages of White Collars (W); WB = average hourly wages of Blue Collars (B). In thousands rupees. 
Blue Collars (LB) = Unskilled Production Workers + Skilled Production and Non-Production Workers 
White Collars (LW) = Managers + Professionals.  
The means reported above are computed by trimming right-end tails so as to leave out 2% of the cumulative 
distribution of each variable. By following this method, the following observations have been left out of the sample: 
WB>7, WW >20, L>5000. 
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Table 4: The transitory variance of wages, employment, prices, sales 
and net profits 
Variance decomposition for Selected Variables 
 
  
Wages 
 
Employ
ment 
 
Prices 
 
Sales 
 
Net 
Profits
Sample 2
vσ / 2σ  2vσ / 2σ 2vσ / 2σ 2vσ / 2σ  2vσ / 2σ  
 
3 Categories    (555) 
 
.07 
(400) 
 
.006 
(527) 
 
.009 
 (495) 
 
.02 
(532) 
 
.16 
(481) 
 
E                      (209) 
 
.14 
(156) 
 
.009 
(195) 
 
.01 
(186) 
 
.03 
(201) 
 
.17 
(176) 
                        
IC                     (150) 
 
.04 
(106) 
 
.005 
(140) 
 
.01 
(133) 
 
.02 
(137) 
 
.14 
(127) 
 
P                      (196) 
 
 
.08 
(138) 
 
.002 
(192) 
 
.002 
(176) 
 
.009 
(194) 
 
.17 
(178) 
 
Notes 
The figures in Table 4 refer to average values. 2vσ  is the temporary component of the total variance 
2σ .  “Prices” refers to the 
average prices for the period 1998-99.  “Wages” refers to the average nominal wage paid in the period 1997-99. “Sales” refers to 
the average sales for the period 1997-99. “Profits” refers to the average net profits for the period 1997-99. 
Data computed after 2% trimming of right-end tails. The numbers in brackets are the observations employed to 
compute the variable means. 
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Table 5: Training and promotions 
Means for Selected Variables 
 
Sample Training  
(% points) 
Trainees/Employees 
(% points) 
Promotions 
(% points) 
3 Categories         (555) 28 
(549) 
35 
(130) 
2.0 
(359) 
E                           (209) 31 
(207) 
21 
(54) 
4.0 
(122) 
IC                         (150) 36 
(150) 
64 
(42) 
1.4 
(102) 
P                           (196) 19 
(192) 
23 
(34) 
1.7 
(135) 
Foreign owned      (22) 77 
(22) 
33 
(21) 
2.0 
(19) 
Domestically owned  (511) 26 
(506) 
28 
(105) 
2.0 
(510) 
P-values for mean equality tests 
P vs. E .005 * .65 .01 * 
P vs. IC .0007 * .07 .57 
Foreign vs. domestically 
owned 
.0001 * .53 .78 
 
Notes 
(∗) indicates that means calculated on the 2 groups of firms are significantly different, at a 5% confidence level  
% Total training is the percentage of firms that takes advantage of  in-house or external training programs. 
Trainees/Employees is the ratio between the number of employees involved in a training program in a given firm and its total 
number of employees. 
Promotions is the percentage of workers that moved to higher working positions during 1999. 
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Table 6: Dummy-variable regressions of the transitory components 
of the variances (in logs) 
 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
E dummy IC dummy FO dummy Size + sector 
dummies 
Locality 
dummy 
Number 
of Obs. 
2.53*** 
(.72) 
1.69** 
(.79) 
2.84* 
(1.59) 
No No 437 
2.27*** 
(.81) 
.28 
(.83) 
2.03 
(1.64) 
Yes No 398 
 
σ2v, Prices 
 
1.80** 
(.85) 
.66 
(.87) 
1.31 
(1.68) 
Yes Yes 398 
.63* 
(.37) 
1.03*** 
(.41) 
1.31* 
(.73) 
No No 326 
.31 
(.40) 
.82** 
(.42) 
1.09 
(.75) 
Yes No 326 
 
 
σ2v,Wages 
.50 
(.38) 
.74* 
(.42) 
.80 
(.75) 
No Yes 326 
1.94*** 
(.38) 
.80* 
(.42) 
2.22*** 
(.76) 
No No 304 
.66*** 
(.27) 
-.13 
(.39) 
.73 
(.53) 
Yes No 303 
 
 
σ2v, Empl’nt 
.50* 
(.28) 
-.12 
(.30) 
.61 
(.54) 
Yes Yes 303 
3.47*** 
(.42) 
1.83*** 
(.46) 
3.55*** 
(.89) 
No No 506 
1.70*** 
(.37) 
.73** 
(.38) 
1.01 
(.73) 
Yes No 467 
 
 
σ2v ,Sales 
1.56*** 
(.38) 
.67* 
(.39) 
.66 
(.73) 
Yes Yes 467 
3.68*** 
(.50) 
2.21*** 
(.54) 
3.08*** 
(1.07) 
No No 464 
1.60*** 
(.47) 
.70 
(.46) 
.10 
(.89) 
Yes No 431 
 
 
σ2v, Profits 
1.50*** 
(.49) 
.70 
(.48) 
-.24 
(.90) 
Yes Yes 431 
 
Notes 
The dependent variable, for each of the five equations, is the transitory component of the variances (σ2v) of, 
respectively, prices, nominal wages, employment, sales, net profits. 
E, IC and P are dummies for the firm’s foreign exposure status (E=exporter; IC=Import-competing firm; 
P=protected firm). Benchmark in each regression: the average firm in the P group of firms. 
Size: three dummies. ‘Small’ is a dummy taking value =1 if the total number of workers is less than 50. 
‘Medium’ is a dummy taking value=1 if the total number of workers is greater than 50 and smaller than 200. 
‘Large’ is a dummy taking value=1 if the total number of workers is > 200. 
Sectors: five dummies for Garments, Textiles, Drugs & Pharmaceutical, Electronic Consumer Goods and 
Electric White Goods. 
‘Yes’ and ‘No’ indicate inclusion or exclusion of the appropriate variable from the regression. Size and sector 
dummies are left out of the third wage regression, for statistically not significant. In the other regressions they 
always turn out significant and are thus kept in. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*, **,*** = coefficients significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level of significance, respectively 
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Table 7: The determinants of training, parametric estimates  
 
Dependent 
variable 
Estimation 
methods 
E 
dummy 
IC  
dummy 
FO 
dummy 
Productivity 
growth 
Size 
dummies 
Sector 
dummies 
Locality 
dummies 
Pseudo-R2 
Or Adj. R2 
Number 
Obs. 
Training Probit .127*** 
(.055) 
.120** 
(.062) 
.539*** 
(.115) 
No No No No .059 402 
Training Probit .130*** 
(.056) 
.123** 
(.062) 
.537*** 
(.115) 
.026 
(.038) 
No No No .060 402 
Training Probit .131** 
(.067) 
.073 
(.069) 
.377** 
(.174) 
No Yes Yes Yes .289 402 
Notes 
Benchmark in each regression: average firm in the P (protected, or not subject to foreign competition) group of firms. 
Dependent variable: share of firms that takes advantage of  in-house or external training programs. 
Row 1-3: Probit estimates. The coefficients reported there are marginal coefficients obtained from STATA ‘dprobit’ procedure. Pseudo-R2 values reported. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* = coefficient significant at the 10% level of significance 
** = coefficient significant at the 5% level of significance 
*** = coefficient significant at the 1% level of significance 
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Table 8: The determinants of promotions: parametric estimates 
 
Dependent 
variable 
 Estimation 
methods 
E  
Dummy 
IC  
dummy 
FO 
dummy 
Productivity 
growth 
Size 
dummies 
Sector 
dummies 
Locality 
dummies 
Adj. R2 Number.  
Obs. 
Promotions (1) OLS .027*** 
(.010) 
-.003 
(.010) 
.010 
(.023) 
No No No No .026 304 
Promotions (2) OLS .028*** 
(.010) 
-.003 
(.010) 
.008 
(.023) 
.019*** 
(.008) 
No No No .043 304 
Promotions (3) OLS .022** 
(.010) 
.009 
(.011) 
.005 
(.022) 
.019*** 
(.007) 
No No Yes .151 304 
 
Notes 
Benchmark in each regression: average firm in the P group of firms. 
Dependent variable: Number of workers promoted in 1999 divided by total employees in 1999. 
The estimates in row (3) are obtained leaving out size and sector dummies. Their exclusion is motivated their lack of statistical significance as obtains from a standard F-test. 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* = coefficient significant at the 10% level of significance 
** = coefficient significant at the 5% level of significance 
*** = coefficient significant at the 1% level of significance 
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Table 9: The determinants of variability, training and promotions: parametric 
and non-parametric estimates 
 Matching 
estimates 
# matched 
pairs 
Parametric 
estimates 
Number  
obs 
 (1)  (2)  
Variability of prices     
Exporters -.03 
(.67) 
174 1.80** 
(.85) 
Import-competitors .73 
(.85) 
125 .66 
(.87) 
 
398 
Variability of wages     
Exporters .99*** 
(.37) 
128 .50 
(.38) 
Import-competitors 1.08** 
(.44) 
92 .71 
(.42) 
 
326 
Variability of employment     
Exporters 1.64*** 
(.33) 
134 .50* 
(.28) 
Import-competitors .62 
(.46) 
83 -.11 
(.30) 
 
303 
Variability of sales     
Exporters 2.18*** 
(.38) 
197 1.56*** 
(.38) 
Import-competitors 1.79*** 
(.53) 
142 .67* 
(.39) 
 
467 
Variability of net profits     
Exporters 1.92*** 
(.49) 
176 1.50*** 
(.49) 
Import-competitors 1.80*** 
(.60) 
135 .70 
(.48) 
 
431 
Training     
Exporters .050 
(.051) 
153 .130** 
(.067) 
Import-competitors .119** 
(.056) 
117 .073 
(.069) 
 
402 
Promotions     
Exporters .025*** 
(.009) 
153 .022** 
(.010) 
Import-competitors .002 
(.005) 
117 .009 
(.011) 
 
304 
Notes:  
The results in column (1) are from matching estimates with two sets of controls (Sector and locality 
dummies). Such estimates satisfy the balancing property tests. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. 
The results in column (2) are the best-fitting OLS estimates from the variability regressions in Table 
6. The probit training estimates are from row 5 in Table 7. The OLS promotions estimates are from 
row 5 in Table 8. 
 
 
 
